Order by the Chairman of the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic and the People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (Order No.62)

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By the Chairman of the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic and the People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, to the Eighth Army, November 20, 1918, no.62. Liski station. Secret.

Most units of the Eighth Army are distinguished by extreme lack of steadiness. Whole regiments frequently go to pieces when they clash with insignificant and also not very steady units of the enemy. The collapse of such units is forcing the com mand of the Eighth Army to stop the gaps thus made with fresh units that are barely formed. These unitS then suffer the same fate, that is, they often break up at their first test in battle. The only way to put an end to this state of affairs and enhance the staunchness of the army is through a system of organisational, educational and repressive measures introduced with a firm hand from above.

First and foremost, the commanding personnel must be taken in hand. Unit commanders have become accustomed to violating military orders with impunity, and referring, to justify themselves, to the willingness or unwillingness of their units. Some commanders reply like this to military orders: ‘My unit won’t march ... My unit is tired and won’t advance ... My soldiers have not received, when they should, their pay or an issue of warm underwear: they won’t go forward until they get what is due to them.’ A commander who is capable of giving such replies is either a fool or a criminal.

In our Red Army there is no class antagonism between the mass of the soldiers, on the one hand, and the officers and the Government, on the other. Working-class public opinion unitedly demands strict discipline on the part of the soldiers. Our Red soldiers will subordinate themselves unconditionally to their commanders if the latter make it their duty to secure fulfillment of orders at all costs, at any price.

The commander who has no confidence in himself and is not prepared to secure submission to a military order is not capable of leading soldiers, and must be reduced to the ranks in his own regiment.

Commanders often show extreme negligence and slovenliness in the matter of communications, posting of sentries and security while on the march, and also in their operational and intelligence reports. The firmest discipline must be established in this sphere. The slightest departure from the requirements and rules of military procedure must be punished in accordance with martial law. A tolerant attitude by commanders where these matters are concerned, must itself render them liable to be brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal, as constituting one of the gravest of crimes.

It must be laid down once and for all, as an unshakable rule, that every Red officer is answerable for his unit, and all attempts to hide behind the backs of units must be punished severely.

In their despatches, unit commanders often speak of withdrawals which are said to have taken place after some hours of ‘fierce fighting’, and of ‘enormous losses’ suffered in battle. In the majority of cases what has to be understood by a stubborn struggle is seme disorderly and senseless exchange of shots without any definlte purpose, resulting in heavy expenditure of ammunition but not one step of forward movement. By huge losses is meant, in most cases, desertions and the break-up of units. It is necessary to make commanders realize, under threat of the most severe penalties, that their duty is to be precise and conscientious, and in their operational reports to give, even if only approximately, the number of killed and wounded, and not to hush up cases of desertion but to call this by its true name.

Commissars must remember that they are answerable for the morale of their units and for the conscientiousness of the work of the commanders. A commissar who countersigns a dishonest report by a commander commits a very grave crime. During batyle a commissar must, especially at critical moments, keep the lower commanding personnel under observation. In those units where the regimental commander and the company and platoon commanders remain at their posts and confidently lead their units, panic does not occur, the soldiers know that they are under firm leadership, they trust their commanders, and they do their duty. Panic, disarray, desertion, breakdown are mainly the responsibility of the commanders, and therefore of the commissars. Every commissar must, after every setback suffered by his unit, consider carefully where the chief blame lies, report unworthy commanders, and, where necessary, arrest on the spot obvious self-seekers who, while not averse to bearing the title of commander in peaceful circumstances, hide behind the units when fighting begins, and incite them to retreat to a place of safety. It is the commissar’s duty to see that the Revolutionary Tribunal shoots such scoundrels. It is necessary, with an iron hand, to make commanders, and through them all soldiers, understand that an army exists not for fun and not for passing the time peacefully, but for the harsh business of war, for safeguarding by force of arms the freedom and indepen dence of the land of labor. Danger, wounds, death, all are an inseparable aspect of the life of a warrior. Fearing them means destroying the whole meaning of the army’s existence. Our Red Army has been given such a lofty aim that no sacrifices can seem too great for its attainment.

We must root out once and for all the very notion that crimes against military duty, whether committed by individuals or by groups, can be left unpunished. A tireless struggle must be waged against desertion. For obvious and notorious deserters there can be only one punishment – shooting. All executions must be published in army orders, giving the names of those executed, the names of their units, and, where possisible, the addresses of their families.

In those cases where special circumstances – first and foremost, the guilt of commanders – induce the Tribunal conditionally to return deserters, or men suspected of desertion, to active units, these men under conditional sentence must be made to wear distinctive black collars, so that those around them may know that, at the first fresh offence by these conditionally pardoned soldiers; there can be no mercy or repetition of leniency towards them. If, during a retreat, a soldier throws away his rifle, his boots, or any part of his uniform, equipment or armament, the cost of the articles concerned is to be recovered through deductions from the soldier’s pay. Depending on the circumstances in which the loss was incurred, deductions may be effected up to the full amount of the s6ldier’s pay over a certain number of months.

Along with punitive measures, incentives are also needed. Commissars and commanders must reward outstanding war riors of the Red Army with gifts, money payments, and the Order of the Red Banner, and the most valiant regiments must be presented with banners of honor.

At the same time the supply organs of the Eighth Army, which at present work very badly indeed, must be set to rights. The attitude towards their work of the persons in charge of the supply services is purely formal and bureaucratic – not just no better, but even worse, than in the old Tsarist army. The task of supply does not consist in covering oneself, so far as the Government is concerned, by means of telegrams, reports and accounts that are more or less fictitious. It consists in getting to every soldier all the articles needed for clothing, feeding, arming and equipping him. Hitherto, the heads of the supply services of the Eighth Army have not managed to obtain the necessary articles from the centre or to distribute them in a planned way and in good time.

I remind all concerned that everyone serving in a military institution is on war service, and that any slovenliness, impreci sion or negligence, and (all the more so) any lack of conscientiousness, will be punished in accordance with martial law.

This order is to be conveyed in printed form to all comman ders and to all persons serving at headquarters and in supply organs, through the commissars, for personal signature. All the signatures must be sent, via Eighth Army headquarters, to the Revolutionary War Council of the Southern Front.