L. Conclusion of the Debate On The Rules. Co-Optation To The Central Bodies. Withdrawal of the Rabocheye Dyelo Delegates

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L. Conclusion of the Debate On The Rules. Co-Optation To The Central Bodies. Withdrawal of the Rabocheye Dyelo Delegates[edit source]

Of the subsequent debate on the Rules (26th sitting of the Congress), only the question of restricting the powers of the Central Committee is worth mentioning, for it throws light on the character of the attacks the Martovites are now making on hypercentralism. Comrades Egorov and Popov strove for the restriction of centralism with rather more conviction, irrespective of their own candidature or that of those they supported. When the question was still in the Rules Commission, they moved that the right of the Central Committee to dissolve local committees be made contingent on the consent of the Council and, in addition, be limited to cases specially enumerated (p. 272, note 1). This was opposed by three members of the Rules Commission (Glebov, Martov, and myself), and at the Congress Comrade Martov upheld our view (p. 273) and answered Egorov and Popov by saying that "the Central Committee would in any case deliberate before deciding on so serious a step as the dissolution of an organisation". As you see, at that time Comrade Martov still turned a deaf ear to every anti-centralist scheme, and the Congress rejected the proposal of Egorov and Popov—only unfortunately the minutes do not tell us by how many votes.

At the Party Congress, Comrade Martov was also "against substituting the word ’endorses’ for the word ’organises’ [the Central Committee organises committees, etc.—Paragraph 6 of the Party Rules]. It must be given the right to organise as well." That is what Comrade Martov said then, not having yet hit on the wonderful idea that the concept "organise" does not include endorsement, which he discovered only at the League Congress.

Apart from these two points, the debate over Paragraphs 5-11 of the Rules (Minutes, pp. 273-76) is hardly of any interest, being confined to quite minor arguments over details. Then came Paragraph 12—the question of co-optation to all Party bodies in general and to the central bodies in particular. The commission proposed raising the majority required for co-optation from two-thirds to four-fifths. Glebov, who presented its report, moved that decisions to co-opt to the Central Committee must be unanimous. Comrade Egorov, while acknowledging dissonances undesirable, stood for a simple majority in the absence of a reasoned veto. Comrade Popov agreed neither with the commission nor with Comrade Egorov and demanded either a simple majority (without the right of veto) or unanimity. Comrade Martov agreed neither with the commission, nor with Glebov, nor with Egorov, nor with Popov, declaring against unanimity, against four-fifths (in favour of two-thirds), and against "mutual co-optation ", that is, the right of the editorial board of the Central Organ to protest a co-optation to the Central Committee and vice versa ("the right of mutual control over co-optation").

As the reader sees, the groupings were highly variegated and the differences so numerous as almost to lend "uniqueness" to the views of each delegate!

Comrade Martov said: "I admit the psychological impossibility of working with unpleasant persons. But it is also important for our organisation to be virile and effectual.... The right of the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ to mutual control in cases of co-optation is unnecessary. It is not because I think that one is not competent in the sphere of the other that I am against it. No! The editorial board of the Central Organ, for instance, might give the Central Committee sound advice as to whether Mr. Nadezhdin, say, should be admitted to the Central Committee. I object because I do not want to create mutually exasperating red tape."

I objected: "There are two questions here. The first is that of the required majority, and I am against lowering it from four-fifths to two-thirds. The stipulation for a reasoned protest is not expedient, and I am against it. Incomparably more important is the second question, the right of the Central Committee and the Central Organ to mutual control over co-optation. The mutual consent of the two central bodies is an essential condition for harmony. What is involved here is a possible rupture between the two central bodies. Whoever does not want a split should be concerned to safeguard harmony. We know from the history of the Party that there have been people who caused splits. It is a question of principle, a very important question, one on which the whole future of the Party may depend" (pp. 276-77). That is the full text of the summary of my speech as recorded at the Congress, a speech to which Comrade Martov attaches particularly serious importance. Unfortunately, although attaching serious importance to it, he did not take the trouble to consider it in connection with the whole debate and the whole political situation at the Congress at the moment it was made.

The first question that arises is why, in my original draft (see p. 394, Paragraph 11),[1] I stipulated a majority of only two-thirds and did not demand mutual control over co optation to the central bodies. Comrade Trotsky, who spoke after me (p. 277), did in fact at once raise this question.

The answer to it is given in my speech at the League Congress and in Comrade Pavlovich’s letter on the Second Congress. Paragraph 1 of the Rules "broke the pot" and it had to be bound tight with a "double knot"—I said at the League Congress. That meant, firstly, that on a purely theoretical question Martov had proved to be an opportunist, and his mistake had been upheld by Lieber and Akimov. It meant, secondly, that the coalition of the Martovites (that is, an insignificant minority of the Iskra-ists) with the anti-Iskra-ists ensured them a majority at the Congress in the voting on the personal composition of the central bodies. And it was about the personal composition of the central bodies that I was speaking here, emphasising the need for harmony and warning against "people who cause splits". This warning was indeed of important significance in principle, for the Iskra organisation (which was undoubtedly best qualified to judge about the personal composition of the central bodies, having as it did the closest practical acquaintance with all affairs and with all the candidates) had already made its recommendations on this subject and had taken the decision we know regarding the candidates who aroused its misgivings. Both morally and on its merits (that is, its competence to judge), the Iskra organisation should have had the decisive say in this delicate matter. But formally speaking, of course, Comrade Martov had every right to appeal to the Liebers and Akimovs against the majority of the Iskra organisation. And in his brilliant speech on Paragraph 1, Comrade Akimov had said with remarkable explicitness and sagacity that whenever he perceived a difference among the Iskra-ists over the methods of achieving their common Iskra aim, he consciously and deliberately voted for the worse method, because his, Akimov’s, aims were diametrically opposed to those of the Iskra-ists. There could not be the slightest doubt therefore that, quite irrespective of the wishes and intentions of Comrade Martov, it was the worse composition of the central bodies that would obtain the support of the Liebers and Akimovs. They could vote, they were bound to vote (judging by their deeds, by their vote on Paragraph 1, and not by their words) precisely for that list which would promise the presence of "people who cause splits", and would do so in order to "cause splits". Is it surprising, in view of this situation, that I said that it was an important question of principle (harmony between the two central bodies), one on which the whole future of the Party might depend?

No Social-Democrat at all acquainted with the Iskra ideas and plans and with the history of the movement, and at all earnest in sharing those ideas, could doubt for a moment that while formally it was quite right and proper for the dispute within the Iskra organisation over the composition of the central bodies to be decided by the Liebers and Akimovs, this would ensure the worst possible results. It was imperative to fight to avert these worst possible results.

How were we to fight them? We did not fight by hysterics and rows, of course, but by methods which were quite loyal and quite legitimate: perceiving that we were in the minority (as on the question of Paragraph 1), we appealed to the Congress to protect the rights of the minority. Greater strictness as regards the majority required for adoption of members (four-fifths instead of two-thirds), the requirement of unanimity for co-optation, mutual control over co-optation to the central bodies—all this we began to advocate when we found ourselves in the minority on the question of the personal composition of the central bodies. This fact is constantly ignored by the Ivans and Peters who are so ready to give opinions on the Congress lightly, after a couple of chats with friends, without seriously studying all the minutes and all the "testimony" of the persons concerned. Yet anybody who cares to make a conscientious study of these minutes and this testimony will inevitably encounter the fact I have mentioned, namely, that the root of the dispute at that moment of the Congress was the personal composition of the central bodies, and that we strove for stricter conditions of control just because we were in the minority and wanted "a double knot to bind tight the pot" broken by Martov amid the jubilation and with the jubilant assistance of the Liebers and the Akimovs.

"If it were not so," Comrade Pavlovich says, speaking of this moment of the Congress, "one would have to assume that in moving the point about unanimity in cases of co-optation, we were concerned for the interests of our adversaries; for to the side which predominates in any institution unanimity is unnecessary and even disadvantageous." (Letter on the Second Congress, p. 14.) But today the chronological aspect of the events is all too often forgotten; it is forgotten that there wasa whole period at the Congress when the present minority was the majority (thanks to the participation of the Liebers and Akimovs), and that it was precisely at this period that the controversy over co-optation to the central bodies took place, the underlying reason for which was the difference within the Iskra organisation over the personal composition of the central bodies. Whoever grasps this fact will understand the passion that marked our debates and will not be surprised by the seeming paradox that petty differences over details gave rise to really important issues of principle.

Comrade Deutsch, speaking at this same sitting (p. 277), was in many respects right when he said: "This motion is undoubtedly designed for the given moment." Yes, indeed, it is only when we have understood the given moment, in all its complexity, that we can understand the true meaning of the controversy. And it is highly important to bear in mind that when we were in the minority, we defended the rights of the minority by such methods as will be acknowledged legitimate and permissible by any European Social-Democrat, namely, by appealing to the Congress for stricter control over the personal composition of the central bodies. Similarly, Comrade Egorov was in many respects right when he said at the Congress, but at a different sitting: "I am exceedingly surprised to hear reference to principles again being made in the debate. [This was said in reference to the elections to the Central Committee, at the 31st sitting of the Congress, that is, if I am not mistaken, on Thursday morning, whereas the 26th sitting, of which we are now speaking, was held on Monday evening.] I think it is clear to everyone that during the last few days the debate has not revolved around any question of principle, but exclusively around securing or preventing the inclusion of one or another person in the central institutions. Let us acknowledge that principles have been lost at this Congress long since, and call a spade a spade. (General laughter. Murauyov: ’I request to have it recorded in the minutes that Comrade Martov smiled’)" (p. 337). It is not surprising that Comrade Martov, like the rest of us, laughed at Comrade Egorov’s eomplaints, which were indeed ludicrous. Yes, "during the last few days " a very great deal did revolve around the personal composition of the central bodies. That is true. That was indeed clear to everyone at the Congress (and it is only now that the minority is trying to obscure this clear fact). And it is true, lastly, that a spade should be called a spade. But, for God’s sake, where is the "loss of principles" here? After all, we assembled at the Congress in order, in the first days (see p. 101 the Congress agenda), to discuss the programme, tactics, and Rules and to decide the questions relating to them, and the last days (Items 18 and 19 of the agenda) to discuss the personal composition of the central bodies and to decide those questions. When the last days of congresses are devoted to a struggle over the conductor’s baton, that is natural and absolutely legitimate. (But when a fight over the conductor’s baton is waged after congresses, that is squabbling.) If someone suffers defeat at the congress over the personal composition of the central bodies (as Comrade Egorov did), it is simply ludicrous of him, after that, to speak of "loss of principles". It is therefore understandable why everybody laughed at Comrade Egorov. And it is also understandable why Comrade Muravyov requested to have it recorded in the minutes that Comrade Martov shared in the laughter: in laughing at Comrade Egorov, Comrade Martov was laughing at himself....

In addition to Comrade Muravyov’s irony, it will not be superfluous, perhaps, to mention the following fact. As we know, after the Congress Comrade Martov asserted right and left that it was the question of co-optation to the central bodies that played the cardinal role in our divergence, and that "the majority of the old editorial board" was emphatically opposed to mutual control over co-optation to the central bodies. Before the Congress, when accepting my plan to elect two trios, with mutual co-optation by a two-thirds majority, Comrade Martov wrote to me on the subject: "In adopting this form of mutual co-optation, it should be stressed that after the Congress additions to each body will be effected on somewhat different lines. (I would advise the following: each body co-opts new members, informing the other body of its intention; the latter may enter a protest, in which case the dispute shall be settled by the Council. To avoid delays, this procedure should be followed in relation to candidates nominated in advance—at least in the case of the Central Committee—from whose number the additions may then be made more expeditiously.) In order to stress that subsequent co-optation will be effected in the manner provided by the Party Rules, the following words should be added to Item 22:[2] ’. . . by which the decisions taken must be endorsed’." (My italics.)

Comment is superfluous.

  1. ↑ See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 477.—Ed.
  2. ↑ The reference is to my original draft of the Tagesordnung (agenda—Ed.) of the Congress and my commentary to it, with which all the delegates were familiar. Item 22 of this draft provided for the election of two trios—to the Central Organ and to the Central Committee—"mutual co-optation" by these six by a two-thirds majority, the endorsement of this mutual co-optation by the Congress, and subsequent co-optation by the Central Organ and the Central Committee separately. —Lenin
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