Letter to the Belgian Section of the International Communist League, September 22, 1934

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The “Belgian” Tradition in Discussion

To the Belgian Section of the International Communist League

Copy to the International Secretariat

Dear Comrades:

I have just received a copy of the letter addressed to the IS by Comrade Vereecken on September 14, a letter whose tone and contents I can only greatly regret.

1. Comrade V. finds that the French youth have misinterpreted his September 3 statement. Instead of contenting himself with giving us the authentic interpretation, Comrade V. talks about “patent falsifications” and “shameful exploitation.” This is unjust. The September 3 statement leaves itself open to being misinterpreted. Three or four times I myself brought to Comrade V.’s attention the objectionable nature of the phrase “on the political basis that this turn will apply only to France… .” Comrade V. thought it well to preserve this formulation, which is at the very least unfortunate, and if the French youth have misunderstood what he meant, he himself is at least partly responsible. In any case, an incident like this — a member of the plenum body launching such grave accusations against the youth of one of our sections — should not have occurred.

I for my part have always emphasized the restrained tone the Belgian comrades use in discussing questions of principle and politics. I saw in it the external manifestation of a revolutionary sense of responsibility. I regret to say that in this particular instance Comrade V. departs from the “Belgian” tradition, which is the proletarian norm. Let us^hope that a single occurrence does not determine the rule.

2. While I cannot venture an opinion on the details of the negotiations about the convening of the plenum, I must say, however, that Comrade V.’s presentation did not seem in any way to demonstrate the existence of maneuvers, manipulations, etc. Only one thing is clear, that there was uncertainty about whether to yield to Comrade V. and immediately call a plenum, which however did not promise any positive results, or, given the situation, to postpone the plenum. Comrade V. unexpectedly concluded this part of his presentation with the sentence: “Calling a plenum where the votes would have been divided, moreover, would not in any way have changed the will of the majority of the IS.” In other words, calling a plenum would not have yielded any positive results. This indicates that the vacillations and the discussions about calling a plenum are to be explained by reasons that are inherent in the situation itself and not by maneuvers and intrigues. Once again, it is unfortunate that in writing this letter Comrade V. allowed himself to be carried away by feelings that could only have been of an ephemeral nature.

3. Comrade V. supports “the Dutch delegate’s reproach directed toward Comrade Vidal for sending his proposal to the French section instead of sending it to the responsible members of the international leadership.” I regret that I cannot accept this reproach, which seems to me more like a pure misunderstanding. Ever since the expulsion of the Neos in France, I had theoretically considered the possibility of the League’s affiliating to the SFIO; but there was more involved than the united front. It seemed to me that the time was ripe.

But it was simply a question of my own opinion concerning the French situation. How could I have gone over the heads of the French section to place a proposal concerning that section before the international leadership? Not only would this have appeared disloyal to the French leadership, but it was absolutely necessary for me to be sure that my own evaluation was correct, to test it against the ideas and the criticism of the best informed and most interested comrades. Just imagine if I made an important proposal concerning the Belgian section directly to the international leadership without consulting the Belgian leadership.

I wrote my first letter to the Central Committee of the French League to indicate the urgency of the question. After that I had personal conversations^ which took some time. I did not give any publicity to my letter before attempting to explain my views and, if possible, come to an understanding with the French leadership. Agreement was not reached, but the discussions convinced me that entry into the SFIO was absolutely necessary. It was then that I decided to formally introduce the question at the international as well as the national level. It must be added that there were material difficulties — with discussions, correspondence, etc.

In conclusion, I can only add that if tomorrow I had some proposal or even a suggestion concerning the relations between the RSP and the OSP, or the question of the NAS, I would address myself first of all to the leadership of the RSP, which is the most competent to judge and the most closely affected party, before deciding to formally place the question before the international organization.

4. It is true that I emphasized with Comrade V. the necessity of an “organizational truce” — not just in the interests of the French section, but above all in the interests of the Belgian section.

“After having discharged your responsibility,” I told Comrade V., “give the French comrades a chance to go through the experience, under your international supervision.” In his September 3 statement, Comrade V. agreed to authorize the League to put into effect the decision of its last national conference on its own responsibility. This prescription, issued by Comrade V. after ample explanations to various comrades of the League, is very important, above all because of its preciseness. Comrade V. speaks about the French section, about the League, which is involved in a certain course of action, and he is absolutely astounded by the proposal to recognize the “two French groups” as two sections of the ICL.

If you count the combined votes of the adult group and the youth, the relationship between the majority and the minority stands at two-thirds to one-third. The majority put the decision of the national conference into effect, being authorized to do this by the IS, including the consultative votes of Sneevliet and Vereecken. The minority totally disagreed and not by chance: its ideas were purely negative, conservative, routinist. Still worse, Pierre Naville saw fit to repudiate the national conference of the League through the medium of the bourgeois press, speaking in the name of a nonexistent central committee.

During my conversation with Comrade V., I emphasized that any attempt to put the minority on the same footing with the majority would mean not an “organizational truce” but a fight to the finish with the danger of carrying the conflict over into other sections. I told Comrades Sn. and V. that if the minority displayed the slightest vitality and at the same time honestly desired to remain within the framework of our international organization, we might consider allowing it to belong to the ICL as a sympathizing group. Pierre Naville’s attitude greatly diminished this possibility, which the plenum should rule on. But what is out of the question is to sanction the lack of discipline and responsibility of a heterogeneous minority without perspective, by according it the right to sabotage the work and the experience of our French section. On this basis there can be no “organizational truce.”

Vidal [Leon Trotsky]