Letter to the Administrative Secretariat of the ILO, January 31, 1931

Add a subpage to this text

Read the help page for usage.

 

Problems of the German Section

To the Administrative Secretariat of the ILO

Copies to the Secretariats of the German and French Oppositions

The crisis of the German Left Opposition, which has taken on particularly acute form these last few weeks, compels me to express several opinions:

1. Among other documents, I have received a copy of the correspondence between Comrade Well and the Berlin Executive. I cannot consider correct the characterization that Comrade Well attaches to the false and extremely dangerous policy conducted by the Executive under the leadership of Comrade Landau. The tone of Comrade Well's letter can only be explained by an extreme nervous condition, caused by heavy personal blows, but politically it cannot be justified, especially in official correspondence.

Comrade Well sets up as the task of his struggle the removal of Comrade Landau from the ranks of the Opposition. Needless to say I cannot agree with the way this question is posed. The task consists in changing the entire character of the work of the German Opposition and its international orientation. This cannot be achieved at one blow. In France the struggle has a far clearer principled content. Nevertheless, the left wing of the League does not set itself the task, as far as I can see, of expelling Comrade Naville from the organization, although it is now the majority in the League. I, for my part, believe that it is necessary to do everything — aside from concessions in principle — to preserve the possibility of mutual work. I extend this completely and fully to include Comrade Landau; the character of his mistakes has not accidentally brought him closer to Naville.

2. In the European Opposition we have predominantly young comrades who joined the Opposition before they had the opportunity to participate seriously and for any length of time in the party and in mass struggles. In addition to that, the Opposition is developing under the conditions of a continuing revolutionary ebb that breeds sectarianism and "circle" sentiments. Austria serves as a good example of the type of characters who are inclined [to seek refuge under the banner of the Left Opposition. This example is at the same time a serious lesson and a serious warning. In the first place — addressed to Comrade Landau.

Comrade Landau bears a twofold responsibility for the Mahnruf group. He not only ignored all warnings in regard to the group but allowed himself also to make unwarranted attacks on Comrades Mill and Molinier, who had given a fully objective evaluation of the Mahnruf group. The last turn of this group punished Comrade Landau severely, showing that organizational combinations and personal relations do not replace political education on the basis of a definite program.

The ideas of Comrade Graef were yesterday still his personal property. Whoever knew his evolution during the last few years could not be in doubt that Graef was slipping from the Marxist position on all the important questions of revolutionary policy. Of course, I did not conceal this opinion from him. Had Comrade Graef come forward with his views in the press (he was preparing a German pamphlet), naturally he would have received the necessary evaluation. The polemics on principles might have lent impetus to the ideological development of the Opposition. What position Graef himself would have developed subsequently — that is a personal question which I cannot answer.

However, what characterizes Austro-oppositionism — to use the excellent expression of Comrade Frankel — is this: combinations of little circles and adventurism behind the scenes. The splinter Frey group, which in common with it has passed through all its mistakes of the last months and years, plus the Mahnruf group, which has undergone all vacillations possible for a circle, plus Graef, who considered both groups incapable — these three groups adopted new views at their conference, which up to the present have not been discussed in the press and on which the ranks of the ILO have not been given an opportunity to express their opinion. Can anyone imagine a more pitiful ideological lack of principle than the basis of organizational adventurism?

Comrade Landau demands that the Mahnruf group give up its new views inside of twenty-four hours. As if that would change anything or advance anything even a single step. On the contrary, the new turn would only prove the complete ideological inadequacy of this group.

In regard to the Austrian groups I fully subscribe to the Administrative Secretariat decision that is up for confirmation before all sections and before the forthcoming European conference.

In regard to Comrade Landau the conclusion appears to me to be no less clear. It must be recognized and openly expressed — it would he best if Comrade Landau were to do this himself — that in the Mahnruf question, despite his closeness to this group, he proved least able to evaluate it correctly; and since Comrade Landau is the outstanding leader of this group, we must draw the conclusion that the methods employed by him were not appropriate for their purpose. That means Comrade Landau must revise his methods radically. We will help him in this.

3. The conduct of the German Executive in the French crisisonly completes and confirms this conclusion. If the German Executive was not informed about the development of the crisis, it is to be regretted. But this does not hold true for Comrade Landau. He was informed as well as any comrade living in another country could be. Comrade Landau did not lack information, but the correct criterion, i. e., the Marxist conception of revolutionary policy, which can be attained through experience and through reflection. Unfortunately, Comrade Landau has displayed an extraordinary disregard for questions of principle In relation to France as well as in relation to Austria he concerned himself more about personal and organizational combinations than about their principled basis. That is unquestionably the most troubling sign of all. Comrade Landau needs a new orientation. He must reorient or the positive qualities that he possesses will turn out to be harmful rather than advantageous to the revolutionary movement.

4. The Austrian and the French lessons throw a piercing light on the work of Comrade Landau in Germany. Comrade Landau conducted an inexorable and uninterrupted struggle for the leadership, while no one knows definitely just what the principled basis of this struggle was. At any rate, Comrade Landau seems to have conducted the personal struggle with apparent success. However, it was a success achieved at the expense of the organization as a whole. A continuation on this path would have transformed the German Opposition into a second edition of the Mahnruf group.

5. In this case are not the comrades justified in demanding the removal of Comrade Landau from the ranks of the Left Opposition as a solution to the question? No. This "solution" rests completely on the maneuvers and methods of Landau himself. If we had an organization that knew its way clearly and firmly, with consolidated cadres, the removal of one or another person could be the solution of a given personal question. However, this is not the situation in Germany. The organization as a whole needs a Marxist education. The first task consists in helping the entire organization to an understanding, an examination, and an evaluation of the mistakes of the present leadership headed by Landau. Without this, the organization will not move an inch. The evaluation must proceed with the publication of definite theses made available to the entire ILO. Only in this manner can genuinely revolutionary cadres be formed for whom all other considerations are subordinated to constant concern over the ideological firmness, consolidation, and revolutionary steadfastness of the international faction. Only in this way can the future political fate of each individual comrade be decided.

6. In the letter of January 13 the Executive declared that it would make a decision on the French crisis and that this decision would be binding for all members of the German organization inside as well as outside Germany. This arrangement alone — I should never have thought it possible if I had not read it with my own eyes — shows into what an impenetrable swamp the organizational-combinatory approach to principled questions leads. How can the Executive order the members of the organization to adopt a certain position, and one that concerns a subject of international discussion at that? Here national discipline — conceived in a caricatured manner — is raised to a higher level than international discipline, and, what is even more serious, higher than the principled basis itself on which alone discipline rests. The result is that a German comrade who is staying in France temporarily and is working in the League must vote on the disputed questions not as a communist but as — a German.

But even in Germany we must consider such a communist useless who subordinates himself to an Executive that orders him to take a certain position in the discussion. No wonder that with such ultra-bureaucratism the Berlin Executive is in a state of civil war with most of its important organizations in the provinces.

7. On July 7 of last year, I wrote to the Executive of the German Opposition through Comrade Mueller: "In general, I must say the following: If the leadership wants to gain authority (and it is duty-bound to want this) it must not proceed as if it already possesses unshatterable authority and must at first base itself as little as possible on its purely formal rights. The Executive must retain a quiet, friendly tone and show its utmost patience, especially towards its opponents. The Executive cannot gain any authority if it does not show in actuality to the entire organization its complete objectivity and conscientiousness in all sorts of conflicts and its concern about the organization as such. Only on this kind of authority, which cannot be achieved in one day, can organizational steps, disciplinary measures, etc., be based. Without this, the organization cannot live. The attempt to use disciplinary measures without the necessary authority and without the conviction of the organization as to the correctness of these measures leads inevitably not to a strengthening of the organization but to its weakening, and above all to the collapse of the authority of the Executive itself."

My heartiest advice was therefore: while retaining firmness on the political line, exercise the greatest caution and mildness, the greatest possible tolerance and tactfulness in all personal conflicts and misunderstandings. At present, too, I can only repeat these words. In the time that has passed since the communication quoted above, the Executive has unfortunately increased administrative measures enormously without increasing its authority in the least.

The way out of the crisis of the German Opposition can at the present moment take the path only of a well-prepared and conscientiously organized conference.

L. Trotsky