Discussions with Trotsky: II – How to fight for a labor party in the U.S.

Add a subpage to this text

Read the help page for usage.

 

Cannon: The subject today is the labor party, in three aspects:

1) Our general, principled position.

2) The development of Labor's Non-Partisan League, that is, the CIO political movement in the trade unions, which shows in some respects tendencies to independent political action, toward the constitution of a party; in other places like New York, half such tendencies: labor candidates locally, support of Republican-Fusion, and support of Roosevelt nationally; in other parts they endorse all capitalist candidates, mainly through the Democratic Party.

3) The question arises should our comrades in the trade unions we control join the LNPL? What should we do in unions where we have a small minority? Should we become the champions of the LNPL or should we stand aside in a critical attitude? We do not have a final policy. In New Jersey, for example, we are experimenting – we had the unions join the LNPL and there support a motion for the formation of a party. In other parts of the country we haven't done so. How should we conduct ourselves in a more or less developed labor party as in Minneapolis?

In principle it appears that we should condemn the whole movement and stand aside, but that is not a very fruitful policy. In Minneapolis there is a fully constituted independent organization, the Farmer-Labor Party. It runs its own candidates in the state, and nationally it supports Roosevelt.

The Stalinists who have been driven out of the trade unions have penetrated deeply into the Farmer-Labor Association – this constitutes a weapon against us in the unions. The [SWP] policy there now is the policy of a bloc of the Trotskyist unions with what they call the "real Farmer-Laborites," that is, reformists who believe in the FLP and don't wish the Stalinists to control it. How far can we carry such a bloc – how far can we fight for just organizational control? But if our people stand aside, the Stalinists get control. On the other hand, if we fight really energetically, as we do in the unions, we become champions of the FLP. It is not a simple question – it's very easy for people to get lost in the reformist policy.

Dunne: First, I would say that the Stalinists, in controlling the apparatus of the FLP, control more than just the apparatus – they make it difficult for us in the unions. By our not participating in this party through our trade union connections, it allows the Stalinists and the more reactionary elements in the FLP to have a weapon against us in the labor movement. We have a definite policy insofar as our work in the trade unions is concerned. Our comrades speaking in favor of the FLP have done so very critically, advising the unions that they can use it only to a certain extent. We have succeeded in keeping our policy clear from the reformists, but, as Comrade Cannon says, it's difficult to say how far we should go in this direction; we cannot take the responsibility for the labor party, and yet we would have that responsibility thrust on us by the workers who believe we can as efficiently fight there for their members as we do in the trade unions. Thus far, even the Stalinists' drive against us has not been able to shake them yet. The Stalinists, together with a wide section of the progressives, intellectuals, are at one in turning the labor party more and more into a bloc with the Democratic and liberal candidates. Inside the FLP, the Stalinists are trying to keep control by setting up a formal discipline in the FLP, mainly against us. We have fought that, demanding democracy in the labor party, and we have been successful. We haven't been at all successful in preventing a closer bloc with the Democratic Party. We can't yet ask the unions to support the SWP as against the FLP.

Cannon: In St. Paul, where the FLP made a deal to support a capitalist candidate for mayor, we put up our own candidate.

Trotsky: Can you explain to me how was it possible that though the Stalinists control an important section of this party they passed a resolution against fascists and communists?

Dunne: That was done in one region. In certain sections we have Farmer-Laborites who work with us – they were in control of this district as against the Stalinists – we have some comrades there – we tried to shape this resolution in a different way but we were not on the resolutions committee – late at night the resolution was jammed through.

Trotsky: The resolution can be used also against us. How is the party constructed? It is based not only upon trade unions but also upon other organizations – because they are progressives, intellectuals, etc. Do they admit every individual, or only collectively?

Dunne: The FLP is based upon workers' economic organizations – trade unions, cooperatives, etc.; farmers' cooperative organizations; also upon territorial units – township clubs, etc. It also allows for the affiliation of cultural organizations, sick-and-death-benefit organizations, etc.; also through ward clubs. The Stalinists and intellectuals join through these clubs; they have more control than the drivers' local of 4,000 members. We are fighting against that – we are demanding that the trade unions be given their real representation – we have the support of the trade unions on this.

Trotsky: Can you tell me what are the nuances of opinion among our leading comrades on this question – approximately?

Cannon: There are nuances of opinion not only among the leadership but also in the ranks. Problems arise in the trade unions especially. A motion is proposed in the unions to join the LNPL. The sentiment, especially in the CIO unions, for this is overwhelming. I think that our policy in New Jersey – that at least in this union we must not oppose joining the LNPL – will have to be adopted. There is also a tendency in the party that in this LNPL we shall press for the formation of the labor party. I venture to say that the trade union comrades would be most satisfied if they could have that decision. But they haven't yet faced the difficulties. The dilemma is that you become the champions of the FLP by having an aggressive policy. We even have one comrade on the state executive committee of the FLP in New Jersey.The bureaucrats are putting off the date for formation of the FLP. The policy of Lewis and Hillman is to leave that aside till 1940. If our comrade would make an energetic fight, if he could be sincere in advocating the FLP, he could muster quite an opposition against the bureaucrats. But then the dilemma is that we are championing the creation of an FLP, which we oppose.

In our plenum there will be differences of opinion – there will be a tendency to become energetic fighters for the constitution of a labor party. My opinion is that this is the prevailing sentiment of the party – to join the LNPL and become aggressive fighters for the constitution of a labor party as against the policy of endorsing capitalist candidates; if we can do that without compromising our principled position, that would be best in the sense of gaining influence. We don't say anything practical to the workers who are ready to take one step forward. The CP now is not championing the labor party; they arc a Roosevelt party. The bureaucrats in the trade unions are also blocking the strong movement among the workers for a labor party.

Shachtman: I wouldn't say that the labor party sentiment is so strong among the workers today. Most of the labor party sentiment that might have arisen has been canalized toward the channel of Roosevelt. We had a formidable crisis, and yet the only thing that came out of it is the hybrid form of labor party in New York. In any case, if you compare 1930 with 1924, you can say there is barely a labor party movement now; then there was more real sentiment in the trade unions. I think that if we don't have a clear idea for the prospects of a labor party, that we will make some big political mistakes. I believe a big change is taking place – a breaking-up of the old parties. The biggest political party, the Democratic Party, which has a support of 90 percent of the workers and farmers, is going through a split almost before our eyes. In Congress the fight is not between Republicans and Democrats, but between one section of the Democrats and another. There is very good reason to believe that in the 1940 election we will have a new political setup with the old-line Republicans fused with the Democrats of the South; and the other, the New Deal Democrats, Roosevelt followers plus the CIO, Lewis; that will be powerful enough even to take the bulk of the AFL along. It is precisely this prospect that keeps Lewis and Hillman from championing a labor party – they are looking for the split in the Democratic Party, in which they will be able to play a considerable role. That is why I don't think there will be real, serious, substantial progress in the LNPL movement toward an independent labor party.

It is true that our position is rather a difficult one, but we have had a considerable amount of experience with labor party movements. A generalization may be helped by reference to our Minneapolis situation – I don't think our growth is due to participation in the FLP movement but through our activities in the trade unions. Nevertheless, as we grow, we necessarily must participate in FLP politics, and I can't say I'm entirely satisfied with the situation there. I can't say we have proposed any other line of conduct. In effect, in Minneapolis we are in a bloc with so-called honest reformists – who are scoundrels on their own account – who are in a bloc with the Democrats. This bloc is directed almost exclusively against the Stalinists and against a mechanical control the Stalinists have of the FLP. In action we are indistinguishable from the so-called honest reformists. We are distinguished from the Stalinists, but only insofar as we are in a bloc with real reformists who vote for the FLP ticket in the state and for the Democrats nationally.

If we are to follow out such a policy of being against endorsing capitalist candidates in favor of FLP candidates seriously, systematically, effectively, I can't see how we can avoid becoming the champions of a labor party, of taking the initiative, wherever a labor party does not exist, to form one. Unless all signs prove untrue, these labor parties will be a working appendage of Roosevelt just as was the case of the New York American Labor Party supporting Roosevelt nationally and, on a local scale, supporting Republican-Fusion. Once that's begun I don't see clearly how we will avoid the consequences of a policy that was followed in 1924, when we were in the CP, with the added complication that the Stalinist party is in the unions; and while it's true that they are a Roosevelt party, still, in the unions, they advocate formation of a labor party.

Cannon: Not much. I would say that the Stalinists in the first period of the People's Front had the slogan, "Organize the Labor Party as the American People's Front," but now it's only a ceremonial action. At this point they are even against a premature splitting of the Democratic Party. It is not true that the sentiment now is less than in 1924 for a labor party. Then it had no basis in the unions; it was mostly a farmers' movement. Now the movement is dominated by the CIO unions. It is not the old Gompers politics. The unions are regimented politically; the sentiment in the ranks for their own party is quite strong. The LNPL is not going out to meet the sentiment of the workers. The policy of Lewis and the bureaucrats is experimental; if the workers will clamor more, they will make concessions to that sentiment. It is a step higher than the Gompers policy.

[Stenographer's note: More argument about the relative strength of labor party sentiment in 1922-24 now took place between Comrades Cannon and Dunne on one side and Shachtman on the other.]

Trotsky: This question is very important and very complicated. When for the first time the Communist League considered this question, some seven or eight years ago – whether we should favor a labor party or not, whether we should develop initiative on this score – then the prevailing sentiment was not to do it, and that was absolutely correct. The perspective for development was not clear. I believe that the majority of us hoped that the development of our own organization would be more speedy. On the other hand I believe no one in our ranks foresaw during that period the appearance of the CIO with this rapidity and this power. In our perspective we overestimated the possibility of the development of our party at the expense of the Stalinists on one hand, and on the other hand we didn't see this powerful trade union movement, and the rapid decline of American capitalism. These arc two facts which we must reckon with. I can't speak from my own observation, but theoretically. The period of 1924 I know only through the experience of our common friend Pepper. He came to me and said that the American proletariat is not a revolutionary class, that the revolutionary class are the farmers and we must turn toward the farmers, not toward the workers. That was the conception of the time. It was a farmers' movement – the farmers who arc inclined by their social nature to look for panaceas – populism, FLPism – in every crisis. Now we have a movement of tremendous importance – the CIO; some three million or more are organized in a new, more militant organization. This organization – which began with strikes, big strikes, and also involved the AFL partially in these strikes for a raise in wages – this organization at the first step of its activity runs into the biggest crisis in the U.S. The perspective for economic strikes is, for the next period, excluded, given the situation of the growing unemployed ranks, etc. We can look for the possibility that it will put all its weight in the political balance.

The whole objective situation imposed it upon the workers as upon the leaders – upon the leaders in a double sense. On one hand they exploit this tendency for their own authority, and on the other they try to break it and not permit it to go ahead of its leaders. The LNPL has this double function. I believe that our policy need not be theoretically revised but it needs to be concretized. In what sense? Are we in favor of the creation of a reformist labor party? No. Are we in favor of a policy which can give to the trade unions the possibility to put its weight upon the balance of the forces? Yes.

It can become a reformist party – it depends upon the development. Here the question of program comes in. I mentioned yesterday and I will underline it today – we must have a program of transitional demands, the most complete of them being a workers' and farmers' government. We are for a party, for an independent party of the toiling masses who will take power in the state. We must concretize it – we are for the creation of factory committees, for workers' control of industry through the factory committees. All these questions are now hanging in the air. They speak of technocracy, and put forward the slogan of "production for use." We oppose this charlatan formula and advance the workers' control of production through the factory committees.

Lundberg writes a book, [America's] Sixty Families. The Annalist claims that his figures are false. We say, the factory committees should see the books. This program we must develop parallel with the idea of a labor party in the unions, and workers' militia. Otherwise it is an abstraction, and an abstraction is a weapon in the hands of the opposing class. The criticism of the Minneapolis comrades is that they have not concretized a program. In this fight we must underline that we arc for the bloc of workers and farmers, but not such farmers as Roosevelt. (I do not know whether you noted that in the official ticket he gave his profession as farmer.) We arc for a bloc only with the exploited farmers, not exploiter farmers – exploited farmers and agricultural workers. We can become the champions of this movement but on the basis of a concrete program of demands. In Minneapolis the first task should be devoted to statistically showing that 10,000 workers have no more vote than ten intellectuals or fifty people organized by the Stalinists. Then we have to introduce five or six demands, very concrete, adapted to the mind of the workers and farmers and inculcated into the brain of every comrade – workers' factory committees, and then workers' and farmers' government. That's the genuine sense of the movement.

Cannon: Would we propose now that the unions join the LNPL?

Trotsky: Yes, I believe so. Naturally we must make our first step in such a way as to accumulate experience for practical work – not to engage in abstract formulas, but to develop a concrete program of action and demands in the sense that this transitional program issues from the conditions of capitalist society today, but immediately leads over the limits of capitalism. It is not the reformist minimum program, which never included workers' militia, workers' control of production. These demands are transitory because they lead from the capitalist society to the proletarian revolution, a consequence insofar as they become the demands of the masses as the proletarian government. We can't stop only with the day-to-day demands of the proletariat. We must give to the most backward workers some concrete slogan that corresponds to their needs and that leads dialectically to the conquest of power.

Shachtman: How would you motivate the slogan for workers' militia?

Trotsky: By the fascist movement in Europe – all the situation shows that the blocs of the members of liberals, radicals, and the workers' bureaucracy is nothing in comparison with the militarized fascist gang; only workers with military experience can oppose the fascist danger. I believe that in America you have enough scabs, gunmen, that you can connect the slogan with the local experience; for example by showing the attitude of the police, the state of affairs in Jersey. In this situation, immediately say that this gangster mayor with his gangster policemen should be ousted by the workers' militia. "We wish here the organization of the CIO, but in violation of the constitution we are forbidden this right to organize. If the federal power cannot control the mayor, then we, the workers, must organize for our protection the workers' militia and fight for our rights." Or in clashes between the AFL and CIO, we can put forward the slogan for a workers' militia as a necessity to protect our workers' meetings. Especially as opposed to the Stalinist idea of a popular front – and we can point to the result of this popular front: the fate of Spain and the situation in France. Then you can point to the movement of Germany, to the Nazi camps. We must say: You workers, in this city, will be the first victims of this fascist gang. You must organize, you must be prepared.

Cannon: What name would you call such groups?

Trotsky: You can give it a modest name: workers' militia.

Cannon: Defense committees.

Trotsky: Yes. It must be discussed with the workers.

Cannon: The name is very important. Workers' defense committees can be popularized. Workers' militia is too foreign sounding.

Shachtman: There is not yet in the U.S. the danger of fascism which would bring about the sentiment for such an organization as the workers' militia. The organization of a workers' militia presupposes preparation for the seizure of power. This is not yet on the order of the day in the U.S.

Trotsky: Naturally we can conquer power only when we have the majority of the working class, but even in that case the workers' militia would be a small minority. Even in the October revolution the militia was a small minority. But the question is how to get this small minority which must be organized and armed with the sympathy of the masses. How can we do it? By preparing the mind of the masses, by propaganda. The crisis, the sharpening of class relations, the creation of a workers' party, a labor party, signifies immediately, immediately, a terrible sharpening of forces. The reaction will be immediately a fascist movement. That is why we must now connect the idea of the labor party with the consequences – otherwise we will appear only as pacifists with democratic illusions. Then we also have the possibility of spreading the slogans of our transitional program and seeing the reaction of the masses. We will see what slogans should be selected, what slogans abandoned; but if we give up our slogans before the experience, before seeing the reaction of the masses, then we can never advance.

Dunne: I wanted to ask one question about the slogan of workers' access to the secrets of industry. It seems to me that needs to be well thought out and carefully applied or it may lead to difficulties which we have already experienced. As a matter of fact one of the ways of reducing the militancy of the workers is for employers – we had one such case – to offer to show us the books and prove that they are standing a loss (whether honestly or not is not the question). We have fought against that, saying it is up to you to organize your business; we demand decent working conditions. I wonder what then would be the effect of our slogan of workers' access to the secrets of industry.

Trotsky: Yes, the capitalists do [open their books] in two instances: when the situation of the factory is really bad, or if they can deceive the workers. But the question must be put from a more general point of view. In the first place, you have millions of unemployed, and the government claims it cannot pay more, and the capitalists say that they cannot make more contributions – we want to have access to the bookkeeping of this society. The control of income should be organized through factory committees. Workers will say: We want our own statisticians who are devoted to the working class. If a branch of industry shows that it is really ruined, then we answer: We propose to expropriate you. We will direct better than you. Why have you no profit? Because of the chaotic condition of capitalist society. We say: Commercial secrets are a conspiracy of the exploiters against the exploited, of the producers against the toilers. In the free era, in the era of competition, they claimed they needed secrecy for protection. But now they do not have secrets among themselves but only from society. This transitional demand is also a step for the workers' control of production as the preparatory plan for the direction of industry. Everything must be controlled by the workers, who will be the masters of society tomorrow. To call for the conquest of power – that seems to the American workers illegal, fantastic. But if you say: The capitalists refuse to pay for the unemployed, and hide their real profits from the state and from the workers by dishonest bookkeeping; the workers will understand that formula. If we say to the farmer: The bank fools you. They have very big profits. And we propose to you that you create farmers' committees to look into the bookkeeping of the bank. Every farmer will understand that. We will say: The farmer can trust only himself; let him create committees to control agricultural credits – they will understand that. It presupposes a turbulent mood among the farmers; it cannot be accomplished every day. But to introduce this idea into the masses and into our own comrades, that's absolutely necessary immediately.

Shachtman: I believe it is not correct as you say to put forth the slogan of workers' control of production nor the other transitional slogan of workers' militia – the slogan for the examination of the books of the capitalist class is more appropriate for the present period and can be made popular. As for the other two slogans, it is true that they are transitional slogans, but for that end of the road which is close to the preparation for the seizure of power. Transition implies a road either long or short. Each stage of the road requires its own slogans. For today we could use that of examination of the books of the capitalist class, for tomorrow we would use those of workers' control of production and workers' militia.

Trotsky: How can we in such a critical situation as now exists in the whole world, measure the stage of development of the worker's movement in the U.S.? You say, it's the beginning and not the end. What's the distance – 100, 10, 4, how can you say approximately? In the good old times the Social Democrats would say: Now we have only 10,000 workers, later we'll have 100,000, then a million, and then we'll get to the power. World development to them was only an accumulation of quantities: 10,000, 100,000, etc., etc. Now we have an absolutely different situation. We are in a period of declining capitalism, of crises that become more turbulent and terrible, and approaching war. During a war the workers learn very quickly. If, as you say, we wait and see and then propagate, then we'll be not the vanguard, but the rearguard. If you ask me: Is it possible that the American workers will conquer power in ten years? I will say yes, absolutely possible. The explosion of the CIO shows that the basis of the capitalist society is undermined. Workers' militia and workers' control of production are only two sides of the same question. The worker is not a bookkeeper. When he asks for the books, he wants to change the situation, by control and then direction. Naturally, our advancing slogans depends upon the reaction we meet in the masses. When we see the reaction of the masses, we [will] know what side of the question to emphasize. We will say, Roosevelt will help the unemployed by the war industry; but if we workers ran production, we would find another industry, not one for the dead but for the living. This question can become understandable even for an average worker who never participated in a political movement. We underestimate the revolutionary movement in the working masses. We are a small organization, propagandistic, and in such situations are more skeptical than the masses, who develop very quickly. At the beginning of 1917 Lenin said that the party is ten times more revolutionary than its Central Committee, and the masses a hundred times more revolutionary than the ranks of the party. There is not in the U.S. a revolutionary situation now. But comrades with very revolutionary ideas in quiet times can become a real brake upon the movement in revolutionary situations – it happens often. A revolutionary party waits so often and so long for a revolution that it gets used to postponing it.

Cannon: You see that phenomenon in strikes – they sweep the country and take the revolutionary party by surprise. Do we put forward this transitional program in the trade unions?

Trotsky: Yes, we propagandize this program in the trade unions, propose it as the basic program for the labor party. For us, it is a transitional program; but for them, it is the program. Now it's a question of workers' control of production, but you can realize this program only through a workers' and farmers' government. We must make this slogan popular.

Cannon: Is this also to be put forward as a transitional program or is this a pseudonym for the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Trotsky: In our mind it leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat. We say to the workers and farmers: You want Lewis as president – well, that depends upon his program. Lewis plus Green plus La Follette as representative of the farmers? That, too, depends upon the program. We try to concretize, to make more precise the program – then the workers' and farmers' government signifies a government of the proletariat which leads the farmers.

Shachtman: How do you reconcile this with the original statement that we cannot advocate the organization of a reformist labor party? I would like to get clear in my mind what concretely docs our comrade do when his trade union is affiliated to the LNPL and he is sent as a delegate to the labor party. There the question comes up of what to do in the elections and it is proposed: "Let us support La Guardia." Concretely, how does the matter present itself to our comrades?

Trotsky: Here we are in a trade union meeting to discuss the affiliation to the LNPL. I will say in the trade union: First, the unification of the unions on a political plan is a progressive step. There is a danger that it will fall into the hands of our enemies. I therefore propose two measures: 1) That we have only workers and farmers as our representatives; that we do not depend on so-called parliamentary friends; 2) That our representatives follow out our program, this program. We then map out concrete plans concerning unemployment, military budget, etc. Then I say, if you propose me as a candidate, you know my program. If you send me as your representative, I will fight for this program in the LNPL, in the labor party. When the LNPL makes a decision to vote for La Guardia, I either resign with protest, or protest and remain: "I can't vote for La Guardia. I have my mandate." We get large new possibilities for propaganda.

The dissolution of our organization is absolutely excluded. We make absolutely clear that we have our organization, our press, etc., etc. It is a question of the relationship of forces. Comrade Dunne says we cannot yet advocate in the unions support for the SWP. Why? Because we are too weak. And we can't say to the workers: Wait till we become more authoritative, more powerful. We must intervene in the movement as it is. …

Shachtman: If there were no movement for a labor party and we would be opposed to the creation of one, how does that affect the program itself? – It would still be our transition program. I don't understand when you say we can't advocate a reformist party but we do advocate and become champions of labor party movements for the purpose of imposing the workers' will politically.

Trotsky: It would be absurd to say that we advocate a reformist party. We can say to the leaders of the LNPL: "You're making of this movement a purely opportunistic appendage to the Democrats." It's a question of a pedagogical approach. How can we say that we advocate the creation of a reformist party? We say, you cannot impose your will through a reformist party but only through a revolutionary party. The Stalinists and liberals wish to make of this movement a reformist party, but we have our program, we make of this a revolutionary –

Cannon: How can you explain a revolutionary labor party? We say: The SWP is the only revolutionary party, has the only revolutionary program. How then can you explain to the workers that also the labor party is a revolutionary party?

Trotsky: I would not say that the labor party is a revolutionary party, but that we will do everything to make it possible. At every meeting I would say: I am a representative of the SWP. I consider it the only revolutionary party. But I am not a sectarian. You are now trying to create a big workers' party. I will help you, but I propose that you consider a program for this party. I make such and such propositions. I begin with this. Under these conditions it would be a big step forward. Why not say openly what is? Without any camouflage, without any diplomacy.

Cannon: Up until now the question has always been put abstractly. The question of the program has never been outlined as you have outlined it. The Lovestoneites have always been for a labor party; but they have no program, it's combinations from the top. It seems to me that if we have a program and always point to it –

Trotsky: First there is the program, and then the statutes that assure the domination of the trade unions as against the individual liberals, petty bourgeois, etc. Otherwise it can become a labor party by social composition, a capitalist party in policy.

Cannon: It seems to me that in Minneapolis it's too much an organizational struggle, a struggle for the control of the organization between the Stalinists and us. We have to develop in Minneapolis a programmatic fight against the Stalinists in the FLP, as we yesterday utilized the vote about the Ludlow amendment.

Shachtman: Now with the imminence of the outbreak of war, the labor party can become a trap. And I still can't understand how the labor party can be different from a reformist, purely parliamentary party.

Trotsky: You put the question too abstractly; naturally it can crystallize into a reformist party, and one that will exclude us. But we must be part of the movement. We must say to the Stalinists, Lovestoneites, etc.: "We are in favor of a revolutionary party. You are doing everything to make it reformist." But we always point to our program. And we propose our program of transitional demands. As to the war question and the Ludlow amendment, we'll discuss that tomorrow and I will again show the use of our transitional program in that situation.